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We provide security bounds against coherent attacks for two families of quantum key distribution
protocols that use d-dimensional quantum systems. In the asymptotic regime, both the secret key
rate for fixed noise and the robustness to noise increase with d. The finite-key corrections are found
to be almost insensitive to d . 20.
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Introduction. – The field of quantum key distri-
bution (QKD) comprises topics ranging from applied
mathematics to technological developments [1–4]. In
such a large field, it is normal that progress may not
be homogeneous. Here we deal with a topic that was
studied in detail a few years ago, then left aside, and
is now coming back to the forefront: QKD protocols
using systems of dimension larger than two (qudits).
There is an obvious advantage in using high-
dimensional alphabets for QKD: each signal carries
log d > 1 bits, so a larger amount of information can
be sent for a given transmission of the channel. More-
over, the first studies indicated that the resistance to
noise of the protocols increases when the dimension is
increased, both for one-way [5, 6] and two-way post-
processing [7–9]. At the level of implementation, qudit
encoding in photonic states has been demonstrated us-
ing angular momentum modes [10] or time-bins [11].
However, at some point the interest of the community
shifted towards different challenges, perceived as more
urgent. As a consequence, both full security proofs and
proper implementations of higher-dimensional proto-
cols are still lacking.
In this paper, we start filling the first gap. For a wide
class of higher-dimensional protocols, we provide a se-
curity bound against coherent attacks that takes into
account finite-key effects. In the asymptotic limit, our
bound vindicates the previous partial results concern-
ing the higher resistance to noise. Moreover,we show
that finite-key effects vary little with d. In this work,
we assume that the signal is really a qudit; as such,
our bounds cannot be immediately applied to imple-
mentations: issues like a more accurate description of
the optical signal [12] and the squashing property at
detection [13] need to be addressed in future research.
The protocols. – We focus on two families of proto-
cols, both introduced first in [6]: two-basis protocols,
the natural generalization of the Bennett-Brassard
1984 protocol (BB84) for qubits [14]; and (d+1)-basis
protocols, the generalization of the six-state protocol
for qubits [15, 16].
A few reminders and notations first. The Weyl oper-
ators, a generalization of the Pauli matrices for larger
dimensions, are defined by Ujk =
∑d−1
s=0 ω
sk |s+ j〉 〈s|
for j, k ∈ {0, 1, ..., d − 1} and ω is the dth root of
unity. The generalized Bell basis states are |Φjk〉 =∑d−1
s=0 ω
sk |s s+ j〉 = 1⊗ Ujk |Φ00〉. The state |Φ00〉 =
1√
d
∑
s |ss〉 is invariant under U ⊗ U∗, where the star
denotes complex conjugation in the computational ba-
sis.
The entanglement-based version of the protocols un-
der study is as follows. Alice prepares |Φ00〉 and sends
one of the qudits to Bob. At measurement, Alice mea-
sures in the eigenbasis of one of the Ujk chosen at ran-
dom; Bob does similarly using one of the U∗jk. In the
sifting phase, they keep only the items for which they
used the same bases. The parameters that are esti-
mated are the error vectors
q
jk
= {q(0)jk , q(1)jk , ..., q(d−1)jk } (1)
where q
(t)
jk = Prob(a− b = t mod d|j, k) is the proba-
bility that Alice’s outcome a and Bob’s outcome b differ
by t, modulo d, when the basis of Ujk was chosen by
both. The probability of no error q
(0)
jk = 1−
∑d−1
t=1 q
(t)
jk
appears in the vector for convenience. Even if we do
not consider this here, note that one can sometimes
obtain better estimates by checking the statistics of
measurements in different bases as well [17, 18].
Now, there are d2−1 non-trivial Ujk, but some of the
corresponding eigenbases carry redundant information.
The most elegant choice consists in choosing a subset of
these which aremutually unbiased bases (MUB). There
are at least two and at most (d+ 1) such bases, which
explains the choice of the two protocols. Specifically,
for the two-basis protocol, we can choose U10 and U01.
However, a subset of the Ujk only form a complete
MUB set when d is prime. Our study of (d + 1)-basis
2protocols will be restricted to these dimensions, the
choice of bases being the set {U01, U1k : k ∈ [0, d− 1]}.
Security bounds: preliminary considerations. – We
focus on security bounds for one-way post-processing
without pre-processing. The information-theoretical
formula for the secret key rate achievable against co-
herent attacks is known and the same for all proto-
cols; but the most general coherent attacks are defined
by an infinite number of parameters, so the formula
cannot be computed directly. For most protocols, one
rather relies on the following fact (see [3] for an ex-
planation and the exceptions): the bound for coherent
attacks is asymptotically the same as the one for col-
lective attacks, which are defined by a small number of
parameters.
The two bounds, for coherent and collective attacks,
are usually identical only asymptotically. The applica-
tion of the same reduction to finite-key bounds requires
an estimate of the difference. The exponential De
Finetti theorem [19] provides such an estimate, which
is however far from tight and leads to exceedingly pes-
simistic bounds. Among qubit protocols, much tighter
estimates have been obtained for the BB84 and the six-
state protocol, based on their high symmetries [20, 21].
The obvious extension of the same argument applies
for the protocols under study here. Indeed, first, the
parameters q
jk
do not change if, before the measure-
ment, Uj′k′ is applied on Alice’s qudit and simultane-
ously U∗j′k′ is applied on Bob’s qudit. This observation
follows from [Ujk ⊗ U∗jk, Uj′k′ ⊗ U∗j′k′ ] = 0, a conse-
quence of UjkUj′k′ = ω
kj′−jk′Uj′k′Ujk. Second, the
generalized Bell states are the eigenstates of all the
Ujk ⊗U∗jk. From there, one follows the same reasoning
as in [20, 21]. So, it follows from this construction that
ρAB is diagonal in the generalized Bell basis:
ρAB =
d−1∑
j,k=0
λjk |Φjk〉 〈Φjk| (2)
where
∑d−1
j,k=0 λjk = 1. For such a state, the link with
the error vector is given by
q
(t)
01 =
d−1∑
k=0
λt,k , q
(t)
1k =
d−1∑
j=0
λj,(kj−t) mod d , (3)
which are always valid at least for k = 0 and valid for
all k when d is prime. Equivalently,
λjk =
1
d
(∑
s
q
(sj−k mod d)
1s + q
(j)
01 − 1
)
. (4)
Asymptotic bounds. – For asymptotic bounds, one
can assume without loss of generality that only one
basis is used for the key and is chosen almost always,
while the other bases are chosen with negligible prob-
ability and used to bound the eavesdropper’s informa-
tion [22]. With this argument, one removes the over-
head due to the sifting factor 1
d
that would be present
in a symmetric protocol. Here we choose the key-basis
to be the one of U01.
Eve’s information is quantified by the Holevo bound
χ(A : E|ρAB) = S(ρE) −
∑d−1
a=0 p(a)S(ρE|a) where the
a’s are the outcomes of Alice’s measurement in the key-
basis and where Eve is supposed to hold a purification
of ρAB. In particular, for the Bell-diagonal state (2)
one has p(a) = Tr(ρAΠ
(a)
01 ) =
1
d
and S(ρE) = H(λ). In
order to compute the S(ρE|a), one starts from a purifi-
cation of ρAB: |ψ〉ABE =
∑
j,k
√
λjk |Φjk〉AB |ejk〉E
where |ejk〉E is an arbitrary orthonormal basis for
Eve’s system. Bob’s system is traced out, then Al-
ice makes projections onto her part of the remaining
system in the computational basis, leading to ρE|a =
Tr(ρAEΠ
(a)
01 )/p(a). These matrices are found to have
a block-diagonal structure with different eigenvectors
but same eigenvalues, leading to S(ρE|a) = H(q01) for
all a. In summary,
χ(A : E|λ) = H(λ)−H(q
01
) . (5)
For the (d + 1)-basis protocols with d prime, the λ
are uniquely determined by the q
jk
through Eq. (4),
so Eve’s information is IE = χ(A : E|λ). For the
2-basis protocols, Eve’s information must be taken as
IE = maxχ(A : E|λ) where the maximum is taken
over all choices of λ compatible with the observed error
vectors q
01
and q
10
.
To do this, we parameterize the λs:
λj,(d−k) = a
(k)
j q
(j)
01 , (6)
where
∑
k a
(k)
j = 1 ∀j. From equation (3), q(t)10 =∑d−1
j=0 λj,(d−t). So, we have the set of constraints
q
(t)
10 =
∑d−1
j=0 a
(t)
j q
(j)
01 . To minimize IE , for each t all
a
(t)
j must be equal and equal to q
(t)
10 . Then since
H(λ) = H(q
01
) +
∑
t q
(t)
01H(at) and at = q10 ∀t we
have
IE = H(q10) . (7)
As a concrete a priori benchmark, we assume that
the observation yields the natural generalization of the
qubit depolarizing channel:
q
jk
≡ q
jk
(Q) = {1−Q,Q/(d− 1), ..., Q/(d− 1)} (8)
3d Q2-basis Q(d + 1)-basis
2 11.00 12.62
3 15.95 19.14
4 18.93 23.17
5 20.99 25.94
7 23.72 29.53
11 26.82 33.36
TABLE I: Value of Q at which r∞ = 0 for 2-basis and
(d + 1)-basis protocols, assuming one-way post-processing
without pre-processing.
for all bases j, k observed in the protocol. In the case
of (d + 1)-basis protocols, this fixes λ00 = 1 − d+1d Q
and all the others λjk = Q/d(d− 1), leading finally to
IE(Q) = −(1− d+ 1
d
Q)
(
log(1−Q − Q
d
)− log(1−Q)
)
− Q
d
(
log
Q
d2 − d − log(1−Q)
)
−Q log 1
d
. (9)
In the case of 2-basis protocols,
IE(Q) = −Q log Q
d− 1 − (1 −Q) log(1−Q) ≡ H(Q) .
(10)
Note that the corresponding ρAB can be obtained
from |Φ00〉 by passing Bob’s qudit through the op-
timal asymmetric universal, resp. phase covariant,
1 → 2 cloner [6]. The secret key fraction is given by
r∞ = log d −H(Q) − IE(Q). The critical values of Q
at which r∞ becomes zero are given in Table I.
The result (10) was already presented as Eq. (22)
in [6] as a lower bound. It was obtained by means of
an entropic uncertainty relation developed by Hall [23].
Strictly speaking, this relation involves the classical
mutual information and as such cannot be used for
security against collective attacks. However, the same
relation was recently shown to hold for Holevo quanti-
ties [24, 25]: so the bound derived using entropic un-
certainty relations is ultimately correct, and is tight for
the 2-basis protocols.
Finite key bounds. – We consider now the realis-
tic case where N < ∞ signals have been exchanged,
following [26, 27]. In this case, all the steps of the pro-
tocols have some probability of failure. For error cor-
rection and privacy amplification, these probabilities
are denoted by εEC and εPA respectively; the estimate
of any measured parameter V may fail with probabil-
ity εPE and the law of large numbers implies that one
has to consider a fluctuation ∆V = ∆V (εPE). In ad-
dition to those, as mentioned above, the mathematical
estimates using smooth Renyi entropies may fail with
probability ε¯. The security parameter is the total prob-
ability of failure ε = εEC + εPA + nPEεPE + ε¯, where
nPE is the number of parameters estimated in the pro-
tocol (for simplicity, we assume the same error on all
parameters).
With all these notions in place, the lower bound for
the secret key rate reads1
rN =
n
N
(
min
E|V±∆V
H(A|E)−H(A|B)− 1
n
log
2
εEC
− 2
n
log
1
εPA
− (2 log d+ 3)
√
log(2/ε¯)
n
)
. (11)
The origin of each term should be clear from the failure
probabilities and has been discussed in detail in previ-
ous work [26, 27]; we have not put any overhead on the
efficiency of error correction. The term n/N describes
the fact that only n < N signals can be devoted to
create a key, because some signals must be used for pa-
rameter estimation. We have minE|V±∆VH(A|E) =
log(d) − IE ; IE is given by (9) or (10), in which the
“true” values q
(t)
jk|∞ are estimated by the worst case
values q
(t)
jk|m = q
(t)
jk|∞±∆q
(t)
jk compatible with the fluc-
tuations. Obviously, the worst case is defined by in-
creasing the errors (t ∈ {1, ..., d − 1}) and decreasing
q
(0)
jk|m correspondingly in order to preserve the normal-
ization of probabilities.
Now, for each given value ofN , ε and εEC , one has to
maximize rN by the best choice of the other parameters
of the protocol: here, the probabilities pjk of choosing
each basis (supposed the same for Alice and Bob) and
the failure probabilities. This is done numerically. For
simplicity, we keep using only the basis U01 for the key,
so n = Np201 (we have checked that the improvement
obtained by taking all the bases is rather negligible).
A subtle difference with the qubit case appears in
the treatment of statistical fluctuations. Consider the
basis j, k and suppose thatm = Np2jk signals have been
measured in this basis by both Alice and Bob: the law
1 In the final term of this expression, the factor (2 log d + 3)
appears. Starting from [26] and propagating to other finite
keys papers, this was mistakenly given as (2d + 3), which for
qubits is 7, rather than 5 as it should be. Therefore this is an
inconsequential change for qubits, but for higher dimensions
however, the difference to the bound can be more significant.
The origin of this term is explained in [19].
4of large numbers provides the bound
||q
jk|m−q jk|∞|| =
d−1∑
t=0
|∆q(t)
jk|m| ≤ ξ(m, d) ,
where ξ(m, d) =
√
2 ln(1/εPE) + 2d ln(m+ 1)
m
.
(12)
The only additional constraint is the normalization∑d−1
t=0 ∆q
(t)
jk|m = 0. So, if d > 2, we cannot find a
tight bound for each ∆q
(t)
jk|m, t ∈ {1, ..., d− 1}. In one
extreme case, only one q
(t′)
jk|m carries all the fluctua-
tions, leading to ∆q
(t)
jk|m =
1
2ξ(m, d) δt,t′ ; in the other
extreme case, all the fluctuations of the error values
are identical i.e. ∆q
(t)
jk|m =
1
2(d−1)ξ(m, d). It turns out
that this last case provides slightly most conservative
bounds, so the graphs are plotted for this case; we also
checked that the brute bound ∆q
(t)
jk|m =
1
2ξ(m, d) for
all t is definitely too pessimistic.
Having addressed these concerns, we are now able to
run the numerical optimizations. Since we are provid-
ing a priori estimates, we assume the observed error
vectors to be q
jk
(Q) given in (8). Also, for the (d+1)-
basis case, we fixed p1k =
1−p01
d
. The results are shown
in Figure 1. The dominant finite-key correction is the
one due to the statistical fluctuations, which goes as
ξ(m, d) ∼ √d rather than linearly in d: this explains
why, for the dimensions we plotted, the critical value
is always around N ∼ 105.
Conclusion. – We have provided security bounds
against coherent attacks for QKD protocols that use
higher-dimensional alphabets, that are valid in the
non-asymptotic regime of finite-length keys. When
choosing either the secret key rate or the robustness
to noise as the figure of merit, this study confirms that
higher-dimensional protocols perform better than the
corresponding qubit protocols.
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